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Resumo A Quinta Geração de Redes Móveis (5G), impulsionada pelo objetivo de co-
nectar ainda mais a sociedade dos dias de hoje, terá que fazer uso de novas
tecnologias emergentes como as Redes Definidas por Software (SDN) e Vir-
tualização das Funções da Rede (NFV) para lidar com o enorme aumento de
tráfego e serviços que estão a surgir. Os serviços Críticos e Fiáveis irão fazer
uso destas tecnologias para criar novos mecanismos e/ou instanciar funções
de rede que tenham requisitos muito rigorosos em ambientes virtualizados.
O uso destas Funções de Rede Virtuais (VNFs) apresenta várias vantagens,
como a rápida re-instanciação em caso de falhas ou a capacidade de serem
escaladas nos serviços de Cloud fornecidos hoje em dia. Nesta dissertação
é feito um estudo em que se compara o desempenho dos Containers e Má-
quinas Virtuais leves (Unikernels) para a instanciação de uma função de rede
num ambiente virtualizado com recursos restritos. Também é implementado
um mecanismo para garantir a fiabilidade da VNF. Os resultados demonstram
que os Containers têm um melhor desempenho no caso de estudo apresen-
tado e que os mecanismos de fiabilidade propostos asseguram a contínua
actividade da VNF em caso de falha.
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Abstract The Fifth Generations of Mobile Networks (5G), driven by the aim to further
connect today’s society, will have to make use of new emerging technologies
such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Functions Virtuliza-
tion (NFV) to cope with all the increasing traffic and services that are aris-
ing. Critical and Reliable services will make use of these technologies to cre-
ate new mechanisms and/or to instantiate network functions that have very
strict requirements in virtualized environments. The use of these Virtual Net-
work Functions (VNFs) presents several advantages like fast re-instantiation
in case of failure or scaling capabilities that are provided by nowadays Cloud
infrastructures. In this thesis a study is made comparing the performance of
Containers and lightweight Virtual Machines (Unikernels) for the instantiation
of a network function in a virtualized environment with restricted resources.
It is also implemented a mechanism to ensure the reliability of the VNF. Re-
sults show that Containers perform better in the use-case presented and the
proposed reliability mechanisms ensure zero downtime for the VNF in case of
failure.
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1 | Introduction
1.1 Motivation
5G networks aim to enable a fully connected society and empower socio-economic transfor-
mations in several ways that are unpredictable. To achieve this all-connected society, the
density/volume of traffic as well as connectivity is expected to grow tremendously [1]. This
prediction of traffic increase is happening because 5G not only will support better human
centric applications like virtual/augmented reality and Ultra-High-Definition (UHD) video but
it also intends to make our life more convenient and comfortable by supporting the demands
of machine-to-human and machine-to-machine type communications. With this large range of
possible applications, 5G networks need to support a broad number of requirements [2].
To better achieve this variety of services and applications, new technologies are being
introduced to edge and core networks, namely: SDN and NFV. With an architecture that
makes use of these two technologies, the 5G network not only will provide better performance
for the end user but it also provides a more flexible and dynamic provision of communications for
different usage scenarios. Being one of these scenarios Critical and Reliable communications
where SDN and NFV can really be differentiators, offering the ability to instantiate the
necessary optimal network behavior at the right time.
Critical and Reliable communications were and still are a major concern to mobile operators.
They are crucial for secure operation of Machine-Type Communications (MTC), such as
monitoring and control systems, vehicle-to-vehicle coordination and cloud-based systems.
Some of these services have very strict requirements that lead to provision of communica-
tions in virtualized platforms between end devices and traditional computing data-centers.
These platforms usually have limited resources and the instantiation of services needs to be
done with lightweight virtualization techniques such as containers and unikernels.
This thesis addresses the role and impact that the enabling technologies for 5G referred
above (SDN, NFV and other core/infrastructure enhancements) can have in enhancing and
supporting services and applications that have reliable and critical data requirements in
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) scenarios.
1.2 Objectives
This thesis aims to implement a Network Function (NF) in a data-center close to the end user
with limited hardware resources. The implementation will be done using two virtualization
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techniques, Hardware-Based and Operating System (OS) virtualization. The two techniques
will be compared to see which one has a better performance regarding critical and reliable
services.
A failure detection mechanism as well as a recover mechanism will also be implemented
and tested to minimize the time that the NF is not operational after failing.
1.3 Document Structure
This document is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview on the state of the
art and enabling technologies regarding cloud computing, SDN and NFV. Chapter 3 focuses
on the description of the reliability environment and the proposed architecture design for the
two implementations. In chapter 4, the performance results for both implementations are
presented. Furthermore, an analysis and comparison of the results is made. Lastly, chapter 5
exhibits the final remarks: conclusion, contributions and future work.
2
2 | State of the Art and Enabling
Technologies
2.1 Fifth Generation of Mobile Networks (5G)
In previous generations, from 2G to nowadays 4G, the main evolutionary purpose to new
systems was focused towards increasing the number of users connected and providing higher
data rates. 5G continues this trend, but it will be much more than "4G but faster" [3]. From
the Figure 2.1 we can see that 5G has a lot to offer us in terms of services where three core
targets for improving todays networks are clearly visible:
• Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) - or Extreme Mobile Broadband, this is the
natural evolution of 4G networks. It aims to increase data rates and capacity providing
a better Quality of Experience (QoE) to the users, broadband access to be available
everywhere and higher user mobility with broadband services in moving vehicles like
cars and public transportations.
Figure 2.1: 5G Diversity of services, use cases and requirements [4]
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• Ultra-Reliable and Low Latency Communications (URLLC) - this is the most inno-
vative feature in 5G. It will be used for mission critical services and ultra reliable
communications that require very strict Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). This
feature can enable new types of services like the Industry 4.0 with automation, vehicles
coordination and real-time remote control [5]. Since URLLC is a very embryonic type of
communications, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) came up with six different
types of use cases given that not all services need the same KPIs [6]:
– Higher reliability and lower latency
– Higher reliability, higher availability and lower latency
– Very low latency
– Higher accuracy positioning
– Higher availability
– Mission Critical Services
The latency requirements for the use cases above vary from under 1 ms to 10 ms
and the reliability specifications can range from five nines (99.999%) to nine nines
(99.9999999%).
• Massive Machine Type Communications (mMTC) - this type of service was created
to support the access of a large number of MTC devices and services like monitoring,
sensing, tagging and metering. All the previous services require high connection density
but don’t require very strict latencies such as URLLC or high bit-rates as eMBB [7].
To cope with this wide range of services and applications, 5G networks need to turn to
new emerging technologies like SDN, NFV and Cloud/Edge Computing. Using these new
enabling technologies, mobile networks can increase their flexibility, scalability while reducing
the overall cost of the network [8].
2.2 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
A new emerging network architecture for mobile networks is SDN, where the network control
plane is decoupled from the data plane (also known as forwarding plane). With the decoupling
of these two planes, the behavior of the network equipments is controlled by a logically
centralized controller that has a full view of the network, providing high level of network
programmability and allowing a dynamic network (re)configuration. Figure 2.2 summarizes
the SDN architecture abstractions in form of a detailed, high-level schematic. Starting from
the top of the figure and moving towards the lower part, the following planes are identified [9]:
• Application Plane - Services and applications that define network behavior are located
in this plane;
• Control Plane - This plane is responsible for making and pushing decisions on how
packets should be forward by one or more network devices. Although the control plane
may be interested in operation-plane information like the current state of a particular
4
Figure 2.2: SDN Layer Architecture
port, it usually focuses mostly on the forwarding plane. The main job of the control plane
is to fine-tune the forwarding tables presented in the forwarding plane, based on the
network topology and/or external service and application requests. The Control Plane
receives information from services in the Application Plane through the Northbound
Interface. Examples of protocols used for the Northbound interface are RESTful APIs;
• Management Plane - Contrary to the control plane, the management plane mainly focuses
on the operation plane. It is responsible for monitoring, configuring, and maintain
network devices;
• Operation Plane - The operational plane is usually the termination point for management
services and applications. It serves the purpose of managing the operational state of
the network devices like the number of ports available, the status of each port and the
status of the device - active or inactive. It receives information from the Management
Plane Southbound Interface and the protocols used in this interface are vendor specific;
• Forwarding Plane - This plane is usually the termination point for control-plane services
and applications. It is responsible for handling packets in the data plane based on the
instructions received from the control plane. Actions in this plane include forwarding,
dropping and changing packet’s headers. These actions are performed based on the rules
provisioned by the Control Plane Southbound Interface. ForCES [10], YANG model
[11] and OpenFlow are examples of protocols used for this interface, being OpenFlow
the most used.
2.2.1 OpenFlow Protocol
OpenFlow is a open-source protocol that enables network controllers to handle the network
traffic by establishing communication between the control application layer and the forwarding
plane, handling the network as a whole rather than individual devices, promoting a more
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Figure 2.3: OpenFlow Architecture
efficient use of network resources. It was one of the first protocols specially designed for SDN
and is standardized by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [12].
The baseline architecture for OpenFlow is shown in Figure 2.3 and consists in three key
elements - an OpenFlow controler, an OpenFlow switch and a secure communication channel
for the controller-switch communication [13].
2.2.2 OpenFlow Switches
An OpenFlow Switch, presented in Figure 2.4, consists of one or more flow tables and a group
table which perform packet forwarding and lookups, and a OpenFlow Channel that connects
to an external controller. An OpenFlow switch may establish communication with one or
more controllers. The communication between the switch and the controller happens via the
OpenFlow Protocol [14]. This communication is established using a specific IP and port,
initializing a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) session
between the swtich and the controller. The traffic between the switch and the controller does
not go through the OpenFlow pipeline. At the time of this writing there are several OpenFlow
switches, being Open vSwitch (OvS)1 one of the most popular ones.
Figure 2.4: OpenFlow Switch
1http://www.openvswitch.org/
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2.2.3 OpenFlow Controllers
The OpenFlow controller, like a regular SDN controller, has a global logical view of the
network. It is responsible for handling the flow tables of the OpenFlow switch and handle
traffic without valid flow entries.
Up to the time of this writing, there are several open-source controllers such as: Open-
Daylight 2, Floodlight 3, ONOS 4, POX 5 and Ryu 6.
2.3 Virtualization
Virtualization is the process of running a virtual instance of a computer system in a layer
abstracted from the actual hardware. It allows you to use a physical machine’s full capacity
by running multiple OSs instances sharing the underlying hardware [15]. Virtualization can
be divided in different types:
• Data virtualization - with data virtualization companies can treat data as a dynamic
supply, bringing together data from multiple sources, integrate new data and transform
data according to user needs;
• Network Function Virtualization (NFV) - NFV separates networks functions like fire-
walling, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Domain Name System (DNS), from
proprietary/specific hardware so they can run as software. NFV is detailed in section
2.3.5;
• OS virtualization - also known as containerization, this type of virtualization happens at
the central task manager of the system - the kernel. The kernel allows the co-existence
of multiple isolated user-space instances. Usually these instances are called containers.
Containers are presented with more detail in section 2.3.3;
• Desktop virtualization - this type of virtualization is usually confused with OS vir-
tualization. In desktop virtualization, a central administrator can deploy simulated
desktop environments to hundreds of physical machines at once. This ability allows the
administrator to launch updates, configurations and security checks on all the virtual
desktops;
• Server virtualization - This virtualization aims to increase resource sharing and allows,
in theory, to create enough virtual servers to use all of a physical machine’s processing
power, thus optimizing the total hardware of a physical server.
In 1974, Gerald J. Popek and Robert P. Goldberg defined a VM as an efficient, isolated
duplicate of a real computer machine [16]. A VM, also known as a guest, is a software program
or OS that supports individual processes or a complete system. They are based on computer
architectures and provide the functionality of a physical computer. VMs can be classified in
2https://www.opendaylight.org/
3http://www.projectfloodlight.org/floodlight/
4https://onosproject.org/
5https://github.com/noxrepo/pox
6https://osrg.github.io/ryu/
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two types. The first one being System VMs, also known as full virtualization VMs, mirrors
all the components and processes of a physical machine, providing the needed functionalities
of a full OS. The second type are Process VMs, these VMs are designed to execute computer
programs in a platform-independent environment.
Hypervisor is a program that allows the creation and instantiation of VMs. They separate
the physical resources such as Central Processing Units (CPUs) memory, I/O and network
traffic to be used by these virtual instances. There are two classes of hypervisors [17]:
• Bare metal or type 1 hypervisors, behave as an OS and run guest VMs directly on the
system’s hardware;
• Hosted or type 2 hypervisors, behave as a normal program and can be started and
stopped like any traditional application.
Nowadays the difference between these two types of hypervisors is very thin, especially
with technologies like KVM.
2.3.1 KVM
Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) is a full virtualization solution for Linux on x86
hardware containing virtualization extensions (Intel VT or AMD-V). Using KVM, one can
run multiple VMs on the same physical machine. Each virtual machine has private virtualized
hardware: a network card, disk, graphics adapter, etc. [18].
KVM converts Linux into a type-1 hypervisor. Considering that KVM is part of the Linux
kernel (since version 2.6.20) it has all the key components of a OS. Every VM instantiated is
implemented as a regular Linux process, scheduled by the standard Linux scheduler, with
dedicated virtual hardware like a network card, graphics adapter (if needed), CPUs, memory,
and disks [19].
2.3.2 Unikernels
Unikernels are specialized, single-address-space machine images constructed by using library
operating systems [20]. They are specialized because unikernels were designed to hold and
run a single application/service that is compiled into standalone kernels, including only the
functions and routines needed to perform the appliance, and sealed against modification when
deployed to a cloud platform. In return, unikernel applications offer significant reduction in
image sizes, improved efficiency and security, and should reduce operational costs. The entire
software stack of system libraries, language runtime, and applications is compiled into a single
bootable VM image that runs directly on a standard hypervisor [21].
In contrast to standard VMs and containers, unikernels present an advantage in terms of
security. Since unikernel services are compiled with the minimal components to run a specific
task, the attack surface is reduced in comparison to the other two virtualization platforms,
where a lot of unnecessary components are instantiated, increasing the attack surface.
At the time of this writing there are several unikernel projects, such as:
• ClickOS - A high-performance, virtualized software middlebox platform. ClickOS virtual
machines are small, boot quickly, with little delay and over one hundred of them can be
concurrently run while saturating a 10Gb pipe on a commodity server [22];
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• Clive - Clive is an operating system designed to work in distributed and cloud computing
environments [23];
• Drawbridge - Drawbridge is a research prototype of a new form of virtualization for
application sandboxing. Drawbridge combines two core technologies: First, a picoprocess,
which is a process-based isolation container with a minimal kernel API surface. Second,
a library OS, which is a version of Windows enlightened to run efficiently within a
picoprocess [24];
• HaLVM - The Haskell Lightweight Virtual Machine (HaLVM) is a port of the Glasgow
Haskell Compiler toolsuite that enables developers to write high-level, lightweight virtual
machines that can run directly on the Xen hypervisor [25];
• IncludeOS - IncludeOS is a minimal, open source, unikernel operating system for cloud
services [26]. This project is detailed in subsection 2.3.2.1;
• LING - A unikernel based on the Erlang/OTP and understands .beam files. Developers
can create code in Erlang and deploy it as LING unikernels. LING removes the majority
of vector files, uses only three external libraries and no OpenSSL [27];
• MirageOS - MirageOS is a library operating system that constructs unikernels for
secure, high-performance network applications across a variety of cloud computing and
mobile platforms. Code can be developed on a normal OS and then compiled into a
fully-standalone, specialised unikernel that runs under a Xen or KVM hypervisor [28];
• OSv - OSv is designed from the ground up to execute a single application on top of any
hypervisor, resulting in superior performance, speed and effortless management. Can
run unmodified Linux executables (with some limitations), and support for C, C++,
JVM, Ruby and Node.js application stacks is available [29];
• Rumprun - A software stack which enables running existing unmodified POSIX software
as a unikernel. Rumprun supports multiple platforms, including bare hardware and
hypervisors such as Xen and KVM [30];
• runtime.js - runtime.js is an open-source library operating system (unikernel) for the
cloud that runs JavaScript, can be bundled up with an application and deployed as a
lightweight and immutable VM image [31];
As for the unikernel chosen for this thesis, two projects were initial selected - IncludeOS
and MirageOS. They were picked for their versatility, as well as documentation available.
Although the MirageOS project provided a lot of documentation, the implementation of this
technology was not successful due to compatibility issues with the OS. IncludeOS proved to
be very simple to install and although a few setbacks were encountered, the help from the
developers and maintainers of the open-source project were crucial for defining IncludeOS as
the unikernel chosen for this work.
2.3.2.1 IncludeOS
IncludeOS is a single-tasking OS created for virtualized environments. With this unikernel
technology, developers can, at compile-time, build their C++ based applications directly into
a VM. It presents three key elements to nowadays cloud platforms [32]:
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• Resource Efficiency and Footprint - Similarly to other unikernel technologies, with
IncludeOS only the necessary parts for the designed service are included, reducing waste
and improving network and memory performance;
• Efficient Deployment Process - It uses a custom GCC-based7 toolchain. During link time,
a single binary is formed using the required elements from the pre-compiled OS-library.
A boot sector is also attached, resulting in a bootable disk image;
• Virtualization Platform Independence - IncludeOS unikernels are written to run on
virtualized x86 hardware. The resulting disk image from the deployment process
can be uploaded to OpenStack8 or automatically formatted to fit most virtualization
environments like KVM.
From the literature [32], IncludeOS was compared to traditional Linux VMs and present
several advantages like:
• Lightweight disk, low memory footprint and overall performance increase, due to
simplistic design;
• Since the OS and the service are the same binary, there is no system call overhead, as
the system calls are simple function calls;
• Reduced number of VM exists by keeping the number of protected instructions very
low.
2.3.3 Containers
As it was previously mentioned, containers are a method of OS virtualization. Containers are
a logical package mechanism in which applications and services can be abstracted from the
underlying infrastructure. This abstraction allows container-based application to be deployed
easily through a variety of environments, such as private data centers, public clouds or even
personal computers [33].
There are several benefits for using containers [34]:
• Environment Consistency - Since containers encapsulate all the necessary service files,
libraries and software dependencies into a block, deployment becomes platform indepen-
dent as these blocks can be deployed regardless of the OS or hardware configurations.
This allows service providers to release new features and updates faster as testing a
container locally will behave and run in the same way as in production;
• Operational Efficiency - By allowing multiple containers on the same host, container-
ization increase the efficiency of computing resources. It is even possible to specify the
exact amount of memory, disk space, and CPU to be used by a container. Since each
container is only a process on the OS running an application and its dependencies they
have very reduced footprints and therefore are able to achieve very fast boots. They
also provide process isolation;
• Developer Productivity - Containers increase developer productivity by removing
cross-service dependencies and conflicts. Every service component can be broken into
7http://gcc.gnu.org/
8https://www.openstack.org/
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different containers running a different microservice. Since containers are isolated from
one another, libraries or dependencies being in sync for each service is not a problem.
Developers can independently upgrade each service because there are no library conflicts.
At the time of this writing, there are several container solutions available. A few examples
are:
• Linux Containers (LXC) - LXC is a userspace interface for the Linux kernel containment
features. Through a powerful API and simple tools, it lets Linux users easily create and
manage system or application containers [35];
• Warden Container - Warden container provides a kernel independent containment
implementation which can be plugged to multiple underlying Host OS [36]. This
container implementation is used by Cloud Foundry project to host applications [37];
• Docker - Detailed in subsection 2.3.3.1;
• OpenVZ - OpenVZ uses a modified Linux Kernel with a set of extensions. OpenVZ
manages multiple physical and Virtual servers, by using dynamic real-time partitioning
[36]. OpenVZ is the core of a virtualization solution offered by the Virtuozzo company
[38].
2.3.3.1 Docker
Docker is the most popular open-source approach for application oriented containers. It makes
use of Linux kernel features, such as namespaces and control groups, to isolate independent
containers running on the same instance of the operating system [39]. All the necessary parts
for running the container, such as code, runtime, system tools, system libraries and settings,
are packed in a lightweight software package called Docker container image. This container
image becomes a container when they run on Docker Engine.
The Docker Engine is available for both Linux and Windows-based applications and
containerized software will always run the same, regardless of the underlying infrastructure
[40].
Docker provides two main services: Docker Engine Enterprise and Docker Engine Com-
munity, being the first a commercially-supported enterprise engine and the second a free
community-supported engine.
2.3.4 Virtualization Comparison
The three virtualization solutions presented, VMs, containers and unikernels, have several
differences. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the pros and cons of these architectures. Figure
2.5 displays a visual comparison of the three.
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Pros Cons
VMs - Isolation from host;- Orchestration solutions available.
- High memory overhead;
- Number of instances can be a problem;
- A whole OS is virtualized.
Containers
- Fast boots;
- Orchestrations solutions available;
- Dynamic resource allocation;
- Lightweight virtualization.
- Low isolation between the
containers and the host as the kernel
is shared;
- Less secure.
Unikernels
- Lightweight VM;
- Specialized machine;
- Isolation from host;
- Higher security.
- Limited deployment possibilities;
- Resource allocation is static;
- Lack of orchestration solutions;
- Low maturity for production.
Table 2.1: Pros and Cons of VMs, containers and unikernels
Figure 2.5: Illustrated comparison of VMs, containers and unikernels [39]
2.3.5 Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
NFV aims to transform the way network operators architect nowadays networks by evolving
standard virtualization technologies to consolidate specialized network equipment, such as
firewalls, Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), IDSs, etc., onto industry standard high volume
server, switches and storage as VNFs. This centralization can happen at Data centers, network
nodes or at the end user premises.
By decoupling NFs from the physical devices on which they run, NFV has the potential to
lead to significant reductions in Operating Expenses (OPEX) and Capital Expenses (CAPEX)
and facilitate the deployment of new services with increased agility and faster time-to-value
[41].
NFV introduces a number of differences in the way network services are provisioned in
comparison to current practice. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
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listed three main differences [42]:
• Decoupling software from hardware - As the network element is no longer a collection
of integrated hardware and software entities, the evolution of both is independent of
each other. This enables the software to progress separately from the hardware, and
vice versa;
• Flexible network function deployment - The detachment of software from hardware helps
reassign and share the infrastructure resources, thus together, hardware and software,
can perform different functions at various times. The actual network function software
instantiation can become more automated, leveraging the different cloud and network
technologies currently available. This helps network operators deploy new network
services faster over the same physical platform;
• Dynamic operation - The decoupling of the functionality of the network function into
software components that can be instantiated, provides greater flexibility to scale the
actual VNF performance in a more dynamic way and with finer granularity, for instance,
according to the actual traffic for which the network operator needs to provision capacity.
2.3.5.1 NFV Architecture
ETSI defined the NFV architectural framework with three main elements, the NFV Man-
agement and Orchestration (NFV MANO), Network Functions Virtualization Infrastruc-
ture (NFVI) and the VNFs and services, as shown in Figure 2.6.
2.3.5.1.1 VNFs and Services.
As it was previously mentioned, a VNF is a functional block within a network infrastructure
that was deployed in virtual resources. The functional behavior, external operational interfaces
and state of the NF are expected to be the same for Physical Network Function (PNF) and
for a VNF.
VNFs can be composed of multiple internal components. For example, one VNF can be
deployed over multiple VMs, where each VM hosts a single component of the VNF. However,
in other cases, the whole VNF can be deployed in a single VM as well [42]. As an alternative
the virtualization platform can be switched to containers or even unikernels.
A service usually is provided by a network operator and can be decomposed into a set
of VNFs. Nonetheless, in the users’ perspective, the services should have the same or better
performance, whether running in traditional PNFs or in VNFs [43].
2.3.5.1.2 Network Functions Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI).
For the instantiation of VNF a pool of both hardware and software resources is needed. The
NFVI is the combination of these resources. The physical resources consist of both computing
hardware, storage and network, that provide storage, connectivity to the VNFs. Software
resources usually consist of hypervisors that abstract the underlying hardware and/or software
resources they run on.
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Figure 2.6: NFV reference architectural framework [42]
2.3.5.1.3 NFV Management and Orchestration (NFV MANO).
To enable network automation, the NFV MANO was introduced. It provides the functionalities
required for the provisioning, managing and configuration of the VNFs. The NFV MANO is
composed by three blocks: the Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator (NFVO), the
Virtual Network Function Manager (VNFM) and by the Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM)
[42].
NFVO. The NFVO is in charge of the orchestration and lifecycle management of the
NFVI and physical and/or software resources.
VNFM. Oversees lifecycle management of VNF instances, such as instantiation, update,
query, scaling, termination, etc.. Multiple VNFM may be deployed as a VNFM may be
deployed for each VNF, or may serve multiple VNFs.
VIM. The VIM controls and manages the interaction between the VNFs and the comput-
ing, network and storage resources. It is responsible for resource management like inventory
of software, allocation of VMs and allocation of resources. In terms of operation it manages
failure information, capacity planning and optimization.
2.4 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing refers to both the applications delivered as a service over the Internet and
the hardware and software systems in the data centers that provide those services [44]. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined cloud computing as follows:
"Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
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to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction."
This model aims to make a better use of various computer resources, achieve higher throughputs
and to resolve problems that require high performance computations. It is composed by five
characteristics, four deployment models and three service models [45]:
• Characteristics:
– On-demand self-service - Computing capabilities such as network storage and server
time can be provision by a consumer, without any human interaction;
– Broad network access - Cloud resources are available over the Internet and accessed
through different devices (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, computers, etc.);
– Resource pooling - A multi-tenant model is used to serve multiple consumers
with the provider’s computing resources. The consumer has the possibility to
choose between physical and virtual resources which are assigned and/or reassigned
dynamically. Usually the exact location of the provided resources is uncontrolled
by the customer, however the user may be able to specify the location at a higher
level of abstraction (e.g., country, data center, etc.);
– Rapid elasticity - Provisioned resources can be elastically created, scaled and
released to meet consumer demands;
– Measured service - Resource usage can be controlled, monitored and reported
providing transparency for both the consumer and the provider of the service.
• Deployment Models:
– Private cloud - Usually this cloud infrastructure is provisioned for an exclusive
client or single organization with multiple consumers;
– Community cloud - This type of cloud infrastructure is provisioned for a specific
community of consumers;
– Public cloud - Cloud infrastructure provision to the general public.
– Hybrid cloud - This type of infrastructure is a combination of two or more distinct
cloud infrastructures referred above.
• Service Models:
– Software as a Service (SaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to use
the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure;
– Platform as a Service (PaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications
created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by
the provider;
– Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to
provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources
where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include
operating systems and applications.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter presented a brief overview of enabling technologies for 5G networks, namely
SDN and NFV and cloud computing. It also presented the state of the art and available
open-source projects for different virtualization technologies such as containers and unikernels.
In the following chapter a use-case scenario is presented as well as the overall architecture
design for the evaluation of this work.
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3 | Scenario Description and
Proposed Architecture
This chapter presents a description of the use-case scenario and the architecture design for
testing the overall performance of the VNFs implemented using two different virtualization
technologies.
3.1 Scenario
For the critical/reliability use-case scenario, the perspective of an Internet Service Provider
(ISP)/Cloud Service Provider (CSP) that is hired by a hypothetical industrial corporation to
host critical VNFs in their behalf is considered. Due to the nature of these VNFs, they need
to be managed as black boxes, which means that the CSP cannot modify or alter in any way
the operation of the VNFs. The service provider can only interact with the VNFs via a well
specified API. Through this API, the industrial corporation needs to be able to send new
versions of the VNFs to the CSP so that the older versions are updated. This procedure is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The CSP is also responsible for ensuring the reliability of the VNFs as well as providing
near zero-time between version updates and failures.
In this particular use-case, a critical network firewall is provisioned. Due to the nature of
the system where the firewall is placed, there is the need for a more flexible way to allow new
versions of the filter rules to be deployed in the firewall. It is important to consider that the
Figure 3.1: Illustrated use-case scenario
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black-box nature requirement of the VNF prevents the injection of new filter rules directly in
the firewall. As such, a new version of the firewall - with the new rules - needs to be deployed.
To be able to cope with the reliability and latency requirements imposed by the industrial
corporation, the cloud provider needs to instantiate the VNFs in a remote data-center close
to the company. Since it is not a big data-center, there are hardware resource limitations that
increase the probability of failure [46]. To handle with this possibility of failures, the CSP
needs to develop a failure detection mechanism that reduces the time the firewall is down
when a disruption occurs.
3.2 Architecture
Figure 3.2 presents the high-level design used to simulate and validate the use-case scenario
in 3.1.
3.2.1 Remote Data Center
In this architecture the remote data center is represented by an apu2c41, a single board
computer developed by PC Engines2. This device has an AMD GX-412TC SOC CPU with
4 cores, 4 GB DDR3-1333 DRAM and a 16 GB SSD for storage. The OS installed was the
Ubuntu 17.10 with the 4.13.0-21-generic kernel. After the OS installation, the system was
turned into a type-1 hypervisor with KVM, allowing the host machine to run multiple isolated
virtual environments that we call VMs or guests.
Figure 3.2: High-level design
3.2.2 API
To simulate the API, the Command Line Interface (CLI) of the data-center is used. In a
commercial situation, this API could be a Representational State Transfer (REST) service
1https://pcengines.ch/apu2c4.htm
2https://www.pcengines.ch/index.htm
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but its implementation is not in the scope of this thesis.
As it can be seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.6, the bridge br-dabc81852bad was created inside the
data center. This bridge is needed to connect the IncludeOS Firewall to the host network.
Since it is needed by the unikernel, when the VNF is instantiated in a container, the Docker
container will also be attached to this bridge to match the two architectures. It represents the
connection point between the external public network and the VNF. It has the 02:42:9b:2f:a1:76
MAC address and was assigned the 10.0.0.1 Internet Protocol (IP) address.
3.2.3 Protected Network
Similarly to the API, the protected network is represented by a linux bridge - br-8c1fd3936e33
- which has the 02:42:80:2d:42:45 MAC address and the 192.168.0.1 IP address assigned. This
bridge is needed by the same purpose as in 3.2.2, is completely isolated from the outside
network since all routes from the host were removed and it only has two connection points:
the VNF and a sink node.
The sink node is a Docker container created with a Dockerfile shown in appendix A, based
on the ubuntu-nettools image created by Robertxie3. This sink node is also isolated from the
outside network as it is only connected to the br-8c1fd3936e33 bridge. It does not fit any
purpose other than receiving packets to test the VNF.
3.2.4 Database
The purpose of this database is to store different versions of the VNF. When the VNF is
updated, the database updates the current-version file with the new version. It runs as a
docker container, with an image similar to the one used by the sink node, that runs a simple
python HTTP server4. The database is only accessed when the VNF is running in its stateful
configuration. As it can be seen with dashed lines in Figure 3.3 and 3.6, the database is
connected to the external network. Configuration files are shown in appendix B.
3.2.5 VNF - Firewall
This is the critical VNF that will be tested in several different metrics to determine which
virtualization platform has an overall better performance. The virtual firewall will be instanti-
ated in a Docker container and in a IncludeOS unikernel, and will be more detailed in the
following subsections:
3.2.5.1 Docker Firewall
The Docker Firewall is an Alpine container5 with the iptables6 package. With these modi-
fications (presented in the Dockerfile in appendix C), the image size of the firewall is 16.4
MB. It is based on iptables rules that filter the packets according to the configuration. In its
stateless configuration, the firewall always has the same version when it is launched (version
0). Regarding the stateful configuration, when the docker firewall is instantiated it downloads
3https://hub.docker.com/r/robertxie/ubuntu-nettools/
4https://docs.python.org/3/library/http.server.html
5https://hub.docker.com/_ /alpine/
6https://netfilter.org/projects/iptables/
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the current-state file from the database, launching the container with the last updated version.
The firewall has two Network Interface Controllers (NICs):
• eth0 with the 10.0.0.2 IP address, connected to the public network (br-dabc81852bad
bridge);
• eth1 with the 192.168.0.3 IP address, connected to the private network (br-8c1fd3936e33
bridge).
This Docker container is launched using the docker-compose7 tool, allowing some firewall
configurations such as resources limits and network configurations to be predefined in a
docker-compose.yml file (full file also in appendix C). A full architecture is represented in
Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Detailed design with Docker Firewall
3.2.5.1.1 Instantiation Procedure.
A) Stateless.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the instantiation procedure of the Docker Firewall in its stateless
configuration.
This procedure is described as follows:
1. The API sends the instantiation command to the Docker daemon inside the data-center;
2. Upon receiving the command, the daemon instantiates the Docker Firewall in the host
(data-center).
The Stateless Docker Firewall is now ready.
7https://docs.docker.com/compose/overview/
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Figure 3.4: Stateless Docker Firewall Instantiation Procedure
B) Stateful.
The stateful instantiation procedure is presented in Figure 3.5 and is described as follows:
1. The API sends the instantiation command to the Docker daemon inside the data-center;
2. After receiving the command, the daemon instantiates the stateful Docker Firewall in
the host;
3. The firewall is instantiated and requests the current-version file from the Database;
4. The Database sends the file to the firewall;
5. Finally, upon receiving the file, the Docker Firewall updates its policies.
The VNF is now ready.
Figure 3.5: Stateful Docker Firewall Instantiation Procedure
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3.2.5.2 IncludeOS Firewall
Contrary to the Docker Firewall, the IncludeOS Firewall is a unikernel. It is compiled into a
binary file via a C++ code where the firewall rules are programmed. To facilitate the writing
of the C++ program, IncludeOS provides its own configuration language - Not Another
Configuration Language (NaCl)8. The full configuration file of the firewall using the NaCl
language is presented in appendix D. When the binary file is generated after the compilation,
the VM (unikernel) is launched by QEMU9 taking advantage of the KVM acceleration provided
by the host machine (remote data center - 3.2.1).
The IncludeOS Firewall also shares the same database as the configuration in 3.2.5.1.
When running in its stateful mode, the hypervisor downloads the latest binary updated to
the database container, before launching the unikernel.
Similarly to the Docker Firewall, the IncludeOS Firewall also has two NICs:
• eth0 connected to the public network (br-dabc81852bad bridge);
• eth1 connected to the private network (br-8c1fd3936e33 bridge).
The IP addresses, MAC addresses as well as the full architecture is presented in Figure 3.6:
Figure 3.6: Detailed design with IncludeOS Firewall
3.2.5.2.1 Instantiation Procedure.
A) Stateless.
The intantiation of the IncludeOS Stateless Firewall is described in Figure 3.7.
1. The API sends the command to the hypervisor to instantiate the firewall;
2. The host launches the firewall with QEMU.
After QEMU successfully launches the unikernel, the VNF is ready.
8https://includeos.readthedocs.io/en/latest/NaCl.html
9https://www.qemu.org/
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Figure 3.7: Stateless IncludeOS Firewall Instantiation Procedure
B) Stateful.
Figure 3.8 presents the stateful instantiation procedure for the VNF.
1. Similarly to the stateless procedure, the Application Programming Interface (API) sends
the command to the host;
2. Before launching the unikernel, the hypervisor requests the latest updated version to
the Database;
3. The Database sends the latest firewall version to the host;
4. Finally, upon receiving the file, the unikernel is instantiated with the last updated
version.
The IncludeOS Firewall is now ready.
Figure 3.8: Stateful IncludeOS Firewall Instantiation Procedure
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3.2.5.3 Firewall Behavior
Figure 3.9 shows two different scenarios where a hypothetical client tries to access the content
of an HTTP server hosted in the sink node.
In scenario A the client makes a request to access the server that is running in an IP/Port
that is on the whitelist specified in the firewall policies:
1. The request is sent to the host;
2. The br-dabc81852bad bridge forwards the packets to the firewall;
3. After checking the policies in action, the firewall routes the packets to the br-8c1fd3936e33
bridge that forwards them to the HTTP server;
4. The reply is sent from the server to the client in the reverse path.
In scenario B, contrary to A, the server is hosted in an IP/Port that is not included in the
whitelist:
1. The request is sent to the host;
2. The packets are forward to the firewall by the br-dabc81852bad bridge;
The firewall checks the policies in action and since the IP/Port of the server is not to be
accessible by the public network, the VNF immediately drops the packets.
Figure 3.9: Firewall Behavior Diagram
3.2.6 Failure Detection Mechanism
As stated in section 3.1, the cloud provider needs to cope with the possibility of failure. For
this reason, a failure detection mechanism was developed that verifies the status of operation
of the firewall. This mechanism is based on the heartbeat software developed by the Linux-HA
(High-Availability Linux)10. It was developed in bash and its behavior is described in Figure
3.10.
The failure mechanism starts by periodically sending ICMP requests. These requests are
sent every 100 ms. If the VNF responds by sending an ICMP reply, the failure mechanism
10http://www.linux-ha.org/
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Figure 3.10: Failure Mechanism Behavior
does nothing and proceeds to keep sending ICMP requests. When the VNF fails to respond
within a 50 ms time-frame, a trigger is sent to the host. After receiving the trigger message,
the host kills the processes of the VNF so that the switching mechanism can re-instantiate
a new firewall in the desired platform - container or unikernel. The platform in which the
firewall is going to be re-instantiated is sent in the trigger message.
This failure mechanism is an illustrative approach with the sole purpose of triggering
dynamic re-adjustments of the system. Other more refined solutions including monitoring
and operation assessment mechanism more tailored towards commercial environments could
be used, but they are not the focus of this work.
3.2.6.1 Switching Mechanism
This mechanism was developed to re-instantiate the VNF after receiving the trigger from
the Failure Detection Mechanism. Additionally a functionality that allows the possibility
of switching between technologies (containers or unikernels) was also implemented in this
mechanism. The switching mechanism, which has its behavior represented in Figure 3.11,
starts by verifying if a trigger sent by the failure detection mechanism was received. If
this is true, the switching mechanism instantiates the VNF in the platform specified in
the trigger message. If it is not a valid platform (unikernel or container) an error message
is printed. On the other and, if it does not receive any trigger message, the mechanism
reads the desired instantiation platform and, in the same way as stated above, if it is
not a valid platform, a error message is printed. If the container platform is chosen, the
program checks if the firewall is already running in a container. In the case that it is,
then nothing is done. Otherwise, if the firewall is running in an unikernel, the host kills
the processes of the firewall and re-launches the VNF as a docker container. Similarly,
if the unikernel platform is chosen, the same logic is applied but now for the IncludeOS Firewall.
25
Figure 3.11: Switching Mechanism Behavior
3.2.6.1.1 Failure Detection and Re-instantiation Procedure.
Figure 3.12 presents the procedure of the two mechanisms working together to re-instante
the firewall when a disruption occurs.
1. The failure detection mechanism sends ICMP requests to the firewall;
2. The firewall responds;
3. Another ICMP request is sent;
4. The VNF doesn’t respond within the time-frame causing the failure mechanism to send
the trigger message to the switching mechanism;
5. After reading the desired virtualization platform in the trigger message, the switching
mechanism sends a command to the host machine to kill the process of the defective
firewall;
6. Right after sending the message in (5), the switch program sends the instantiation
command to the host.
When the hypervisor receives the command, the stateful instantiation procedure for the
selected platform begins. This process is fully explained in the previous sections 3.2.5.1.1 and
3.2.5.2.1.
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Figure 3.12: Firewall Failure with Re-instantiation Procedure
3.2.6.1.2 Switching Without Failure.
When the switching procedure is invoked without the VNF having failed, two options
can happen: the firewall is not running in the desired platform and the host has to switch
virtualization technology, or the firewall is already running in the selected technology. These
two procedures are described in Figure 3.13 with option a) and option b), respectively.
1. A switch in the VNF platform is requested;
2. The switching mechanism verifies the technology in which the firewall is instantiated;
Option a)
3. The mechanism sends a command to the host machine to kill the process of the running
VNF;
Figure 3.13: Switching Procedure
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4. Right after sending the previous message, the switch program sends the instantiation
command to the host.
After receiving the instantiation command the host starts the instantiation procedure in the
opposite platform.
Option b)
3. The switch mechanism informs the host that the firewall is already running in the
desired platform.
3.3 SDN Recovery Mechanism
To further reduce the downtime of the VNF, a SDN recovery mechanism was implemented.
This mechanism prevents loss of connection between the outside network and the private
network between a VNF fail detection and the re-instantiation of a new VNF, providing
seamless VNF instantiation.
To achieve this, the Ryu SDN controller was installed and the Linux bridges - br-
dabc81852bad and br-8c1fd3936e33 - were replaced with OvS bridges - br0 and br1 respectively.
Both bridges are connected to the SDN controller. A full architecture is presented in Figure
3.14:
Figure 3.14: Detailed design with SDN Recovery Mechanism
To achieve this, a backup VNF is necessary, that can be automatically instantiated when
the main VNF shows signs of failure (e.g. memory usage close to memory limit) or can be
running in parallel with the main VNF.
Fig. 3.15 shows the diagram for two cases:
Case a) - A failure is detected in the firewall:
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Figure 3.15: SDN Recovery Control Signaling Diagram
1. The failure detection mechanism sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
requests to the firewall;
2. The VNF responds with an ICMP reply;
3. Another ICMP request is sent;
4. Since the firewall does not respond to the ICMP request, meaning that an error occurred,
a REST message is sent to the SDN controller, notifying the failure of the main VNF;
5. After receiving the trigger message, the controller updates the flow tables of both OvS
bridges.
Case b) - Threshold of used RAM is reached triggering the instantiation of the backup
VNF:
1. The host reads the RAM consumption of the main VNF;
The RAM consumption reaches critical values (80% of total RAM allocated to the VNF),
the instantiation procedure of the backup VNF begins;
2. When the backup VNF is fully operational, a REST message is sent to the SDN
controller;
3. After receiving the trigger message, the controller updates the flow tables of both OvS
bridges.
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Once the OvS bridges update their flow tables, the packets that were previously being
sent to the main VNF, are now forwarded to the backup VNF, ensuring the reliability of the
service.
3.4 Summary
This chapter introduced an overview of the design for the critical and reliable use-case scenario.
Both architectures, with container and with unikernel VNF were also presented, as well as the
details for the remaining infrastructure and mechanisms to ensure reliability. In the following
chapters the VNFs using both virtualization technologies are evaluated and the results are
presented.
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4 | Evaluation
This chapter presents the tests and relating performance results regarding the architectures
using two types of virtualization presented in the previous chapter.
Both architectures were evaluated in several indicators such as image size, instantiation times,
latency, throughput, jitter, TCP retransmissions and percentage of datagrams lost.
For the Docker and IncludeOS VNFs, all the tests were done using the architectures
presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.6. These architectures are fully described in section 3.2 of
chapter 3. Unless stated otherwise, all the tests were executed 10 times and the related results
present their average values with a confidence interval of 95%.
4.1 VNF Size
Table 4.1 compares the image size of the two VNFs.
VNF Size (MBytes)
Docker Firewall 16.4
IncludeOS Firewall 3.2
Table 4.1: VNF Image Size
It can be seen that the Docker firewall is approximately 5 times larger than the IncludeOS
firewall. The reason for this huge difference has to do with the versatility of the VNF. The
Docker Firewall runs as a tiny OS while the unikernel has limited capacities, having the sole
purpose of running the C++ code compiled into the image. It should be noted that the actual
size of the firewall program is also different for the two implementations, the Docker VNF
uses the iptables package1 (1.54 MBytes) and the IncludeOS firewall itself uses 0.5 Mbytes,
since the unikernel platform needs a minimum of 2.7 MBytes to be able to run.
As for memory, both implementations have 256 MB of RAM allocated.
4.2 Instantiation Time
A crucial metric regarding critical and reliable communications is the time it takes to instantiate
a VNF when requested. For measuring the instantiation of the two different VNFs, it was
considered the time it took from the launch command until the firewall was ready with
1https://pkgs.alpinelinux.org/package/edge/main/x86/iptables
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all policies implemented. This instantiation process was described in sections 3.2.5.1.1 and
3.2.5.2.1.
The time was measured immediately before the instantiation command and immediately
after the last rule, measured in milliseconds using the Unix epoch time2. Figure 4.1 shows
the instantiation time for both Docker and IncludeOS Firewalls with the two configurations,
stateless and stateful.
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Figure 4.1: Instantiation Time - a) Stateless IncludeOS Firewall; b) Stateful IncludeOS Firewall; c)
Stateless Docker Firewall; d) Stateful Docker Firewall
It can be clearly seen that when the VNF is instantiated in a container it’s around 2,3
seconds faster than when it’s launched in a unikernel. Regarding the difference between the
stateless and stateful configuration, for both virtualization platforms, the instantiation takes
approximately the same amount of time. The location of the Database container has to be
taken into account for the stateful instantiation. In this architecture the Database is in the
same location as the VNF. If this Database was located in another data-center for example,
the launching time would have increased since the firewall version would have taken more
time to download.
4.3 Latency
For the purpose of this evaluation, the latency refers to the Round Trip Time (RTT) of a
packet. This test intends to see how the VNFs affect the latency in a end-to-end connection
and was measured using the ping tool, belonging to the Network Tools Package3. This tool
2https://www.epochconverter.com/
3https://network-tools.com/
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generates an ICMP Request every second and waits for a reply, measuring the time between
the two. This test was done 10 times from the side of the API and 10 from the side of the
Sink node - Figures 3.3 and 3.6 show, in bold lines, the travel path for the ICMP packets.
The results are presented in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Latency
From observing the figure, the latency of the end-to-end connection when the firewall
is instantiated in an unikernel is approximately 0.79 ms, as for the Docker instantiation,
end-to-end latencies round the 0.27 ms, almost 3 times less. It can be deducted that this
latency difference happens because of the time the packets are being processed by the firewall,
since the ICMP packets travel the same path in both implementations.
4.4 Policy Updates
This section focuses on the evaluation of the VNFs when submitted to policy updates. The
two technologies are updated in different ways due to the nature of the each firewall.
To perform updates on the IncludeOS firewall, the LiveUpdate software4 developed
by Alf-Andre Walla was used. LiveUpdate is a state-transfer based Dynamic Software
Updating (DSU), meaning it stores only the state, the minimal amount of data, that service
writers deem necessary to resume service operation seamlessly after an update [47]. With this
feature, the unikernel updates when a new version of the binary is sent to the platform.
For the Docker firewall to update its rules, a bash script with new iptables rules is sent
to execute in the container5. After the script is executed, the firewall has the new policies
4https://github.com/hioa-cs/IncludeOS/tree/master/examples/LiveUpdate
5https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/
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applied.
The next subsections present the results of three different scenarios of policy updates for
the two firewalls.
4.4.1 Whitelist Static Update
In this first scenario the firewall whitelist is updated. Initially the VNFs only have 3 IP
addresses to which is allowed connection from the public network (192.168.0.1-3). After the
whitelist is updated, the firewall allows connections from 100 addresses in the private network
(192.168.0.1-100). Figure 4.3 shows the update time for the Docker Firewall and for the
IncludeOS Firewall when the new rules need to be compiled into the new binary and when
the binary is previously compiled. The tests were performed 20 times and present the mean
value and a confidence interval of 95%.
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Figure 4.3: Whitelist Static Update - a) IncludeOS FW With Compilation; b) IncludeOS FW
Pre-Compiled; c) Docker FW
It is clear that when the IncludeOS firewall needs to be compiled on demand, the update
times are enormous compared to the other two, as most of the time is spent by the C++
compiler. On the other hand, when the binary is previously compiled, the IncludeOS update
is the fastest taking approximately 150 ms which is around 23 times faster than the Docker
Firewall.
4.4.2 Whitelist Incremental Update
The second scenario is very similar to the first one, but instead of statically updating the
whitelist from 3 to 100 allowed addresses, the whitelist is updated with increments of 10,
starting with 10 addresses and finishing with 254 addresses. For all updates the baseline
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version only has 3 IPs in the whitelist. The tests were made 3 times for each incrementation
and the mean values are presented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Whitelist Incremental Update
From evaluating the previous figure, two aspects are evident. The first is that the number
of IPs added to the whitelist doesn’t affect the time of compilation or the update time for
IncludeOS. This behavior was expected as the C++ code needs to be modified and compiled
before the VNF can be launched with new policies.
For second, it is seen that the update time for the Docker Firewall exhibits a slow
exponential rate ranging from around 1 to 12 seconds. This happens because the script
updating the policies needs to apply the iptables commands to a large number of IPs, taking
a longer amount of time.
4.4.3 New Rule Update
In this last scenario, a new rule is added to the firewall policy - the port 444 is opened for
TCP traffic. Similarly to the two previous subsections, the VNFs have the whitelist with only
3 IPs. The tests were performed 20 times and the Figure 4.5 presents the mean value and a
confidence interval of 95%.
As in the previous scenarios, the IncludeOS firewall update is the fastest when pre-compiled.
Theres is a slight decrease of nearly 2.5 seconds in update time of the Docker container in
comparison to the first scenario and it takes approximately the same time as the first sample
in the second scenario.
From this three scenarios examined above, it became evident that the update time of the
IncludeOS Firewall remains the same for every case either with compilation or pre-compiled -
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Figure 4.5: New Rule Update - a) IncludeOS FW With Compilation; b) IncludeOS FW Pre-Compiled;
c) Docker FW
roughly 150 ms. As for the Docker Firewall, the update time varies according to the number
of iptables commands in the update script, being approximately 780 ms the lowest recorded
update time.
In the following section, the VNFs will be tested to see how they perform when traffic
passes through as well as when a update occurs.
4.5 Traffic Traversing VNF
This section addresses the overall ability to handle high quantities of traffic passing through
the firewall. Three performance tests were made for each VNF, the first with TCP traffic and
the other two with UDP traffic - 100 Mbps target bandwidth and 1 Gbps target bandwidth.
These tests were performed using the iPerf3 tool6. The iPerf server was started on port 80
of the Sink container. The client makes connection from the CLI of the data-center with a
buffer length of 1400 Bytes.
4.5.1 TCP Traffic
Figure 4.6 shows the results after performing the iPerf 20 times for each platform using TCP
packets.
The Docker Firewall has a better performance in both metrics. An average throughput
of 120 Mbits/s compared to 100 MBytes/s from the IncludeOS and no TCP segments were
retransmitted in all 20 tests as in the unikernel there were an average of 1.10 TCP segments
retransmitted, that translates into 0.013% of the total TCP packets sent. Notwithstanding
6https://iperf.fr/
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Figure 4.6: TCP Performance - a) IncludeOS FW; b) Docker FW
the small percentage of retransmitted packets, this difference can be justified by the latency
delay introduced by the IncludeOS firewall, as it was shown in section 4.3.
4.5.2 UDP Traffic
For UDP traffic two target bandwidths were set - 100 Mbits/s and 1Gbit/s - represented in
blue and red respectively in Figure 4.7. Like the previous subsection, the tests were performed
20 times for each VNF.
Contrary to 4.5.1, IncludeOS has approximately the same performance as the Docker with
100 Mbits/s target bandwidth, only stays behind in the datagram loss since the container
doesn’t lose any datagrams.
When the target bandwidth is set to 1 Gbits/s on the iPerf client, the performance of the
unikernel improves in comparison to the container, 160 Mbits/s of throughput - 20 Mbits/s
better than the container.
In both technologies the target bandwidth of 1 Gbps is not reached due to the size of the
UDP packets (1400 bytes).
In contrast, the average Jitter in the Docker Firewall stays constant and in the unikernel
increases to double (0.06 ms). The datagram loss stays equal from the previous setup - 1%
for IncludeOS and zero losses for Docker. This losses in the unikernel happen for the same
reason as the TCP retransmissions in 4.5.1, the delay introduced by the IncludeOS Firewall.
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Figure 4.7: UDP Performance - a) IncludeOS FW; b) Docker FW
4.5.3 TCP Traffic with Firewall Update
To evaluate the impact of an update on the VNFs when traffic is passing through, an update
was launched into the firewall while the iPerf is running. This iPerf has the same specifications
as in 4.5.1 and was performed 10 times during 10 seconds, with the results being presented in
the following Figure 4.8.
For both VNFs, the update is sent at Time = 2 sec.
For the IncludeOS firewall, represented in blue, the update can be easily seen happening at
Time = 5 sec. where there is a decrease in throughput. This decrease is followed by a high
increase in TCP segments being retransmitted in the following seconds.
Regarding the Docker VNF, the update can also be seen at Time = 6 sec. where a
decrease also occurs but less pronounced. In comparison to the unikernel, the container
doesn’t retransmit any TCP segments meaning that there weren’t any failures in transmission.
This major difference in TCP retransmission between the two platforms happens because
the IncludeOS firewall is disabled for the time it takes to update, while the Docker firewall
doesn’t need to be disabled to be able to update.
For both implementations, the update takes longer than the estimated time presented in
the previous section 4.4. This difference happens due to the high quantities of traffic passing
through the VNF.
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Figure 4.8: TCP Performance with Firewall Update
4.5.4 UDP Traffic with Firewall Update
In the same way as in 4.5.2, both types of virtualization were tested with two different iPerfs
for UDP traffic, the first with 100 Mbps target bandwidth and the second with 1 Gbps. For
both bandwidth targets, the update was sent at Time = 2 sec.
4.5.4.1 100 Mbps Target Bandwidth
The results of the 10 performance tests are presented in Figure 4.9. After evaluating the
results, the IncludeOS firewall, in the same manner as in 4.5.3, at Time = 6 sec. a decrease
in throughput take place when the update occurs as well as an increase in the percentage of
datagrams lost.
For the Docker container, the update happens almost unnoticed, since the percentage
of datagrams lost is always zero, and the throughput remains in average values throughout
the 10 seconds of evaluation time. Contrary to the IncludeOS firewall, with the container
instantiation there is not disruption of the service since the Docker firewall keeps running
while the rules are updated. The only sign we get from the update is a minor increase in
Jitter at Time = 5 sec.
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Figure 4.9: UDP (100 Mbps) Performance with Firewall Update
4.5.4.2 1 Gbps Target Bandwidth
When the target bandwidth is set to 1 Gbps in the iPerf, despite having a throughput decline
when an update occurs (Time = 8 sec.), the IncludeOS firewall has better performance in
comparison to the Docker firewall in this metric. The unikernel only falls behind in Jitter and
in the number of datagrams lost where there is 80% of datagrams lost at Time = 8 sec. The
overall evaluation for this test is explicit in Figure 4.10.
Overall, when the VNF is instantiated in a Docker container, its performance remains
practically the same throughout the whole evaluation.
For the IncludeOS implementation, the throughput always declines when an update occurs
for all three tests. It also exhibits approximately 80% of datagrams lost when the update is
done while UDP 1 Gbps traffic is traversing the firewall.
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Figure 4.10: UDP (1 Gbps) Performance with Firewall Update
4.6 Failure Detection Mechanism
This section includes the tests and evaluation of both failure detection and switching mecha-
nisms detailed in chapter 3.
4.6.1 Failure Detection Time
The failure detection time is determined based on time interval that the VNF fails to respond.
This time interval is calculated using the Failure Detection Mechanism, described in section
3.2.6. To calculate this failure detection time, a time stamp was stored in a variable - t1 -
before every ICMP request. When the VNF fails to respond, the trigger is activated and
another time stamp is stored in a second variable - t2. Subtracting these two variables gives
us an estimate of the time it takes to detect a failure in the firewall. This test was repeated
10 times and the average values for each VNF as well as the confidence intervals are presented
in Figure 4.11:
From analyzing the figure, it is visible that the impact of the VNF is negligible for the
time it takes the mechanism to detect the failure, having just a difference of roughly 3 ms.
41
IncludeOS Docker
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Figure 4.11: Failure Detection Time
4.6.2 Re-instantiation Time
For measuring the time of re-instantiation, the two reliability mechanisms are necessary - the
Failure Detection Mechanism and the Swicthing Mechanism, both described in sections 3.2.6
and 3.2.6.1 of chapter 3. The re-instantiation time takes into account the time of failure plus
the time that the switching mechanism takes to instantiate the VNF in the desired platform.
Similarly to the previous test, the time stamp taken before the ICMP requests is stored in a
variable and passed to the switching mechanism alongside the disered platform. After the
re-instantiation of the firewall is completed, another time stamp is taken and subtracted to
the time stamp from the failure mechanism given us the total time for the re-instantiation of
the VNF.
Figure 4.12 presents the results for the 4 possible scenarios of re-instantiation: a) When
the VNF is running as a IncludeOS unikernel and is re-instantiated in the same platform; b)
The firewall is running as a Docker container and and is re-instantiated in the same platform;
c) The VNF is originally instantiated as a unikernel and is recovered into a container; d) For
theoretical purposes, a final scenario was also evaluated, where the firewall in running as a
Docker container and is re-instantiated in a unikernel. This scenario is purely conceptual
since the instantiation in a IncludeOS unikernel takes roughly 2 seconds longer than the
re-instantiation in a Docker container, making it a less ideal solution.
From the figure it is clearly seen that the re-instantiation is faster when the VNF is
re-launched into a Docker container, taking around 3 seconds in b) and 4 seconds in c). As
for IncludeOS, it has the worst re-instantiation times, 5.5 seconds for a) and approximately
6.4 seconds for d).
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Figure 4.12: Re-instantiation Time - a) IncludeOS to IncludeOS; b) Docker to Docker; c) IncludeOS
to Docker; d) Docker to IncludeOS
These two mechanisms will also be tested when a on-going connection is traversing the
VNF, in the following subsection.
4.6.3 Traffic Behavior With VNF Failure
The following tests intend to evaluate the two reliability mechanisms in a realistic scenario
and endorse the previous results.
The same iPerf tool as in 4.5 was used for simulating a connection between the API and
the sink node. Both VNFs were tested with TCP and UDP traffic passing through.
4.6.3.1 TCP Traffic
For each VNF, the test was replicated 3 times, each time 10 evaluations of 10 seconds were
made. At first, a failure was induced with the reliability mechanisms turned off. The second
tests were done with the failure mechanism working and being the IncludeOS the desired
re-instantiation platform. Finally the tests were repeated with the reliability mechanisms
working and the re-instantiation to be done with Docker.
The results for all the tests are presented in the following figures. Figure 4.13 shows the
results when a failure is induced in the IncludeOS firewall and Figure 4.14 present the results
when the VNF is initially running as a Docker container.
For all the tests, the a failure was induced at Time = 3 sec.
From the evaluation of the two figures it is clear that when the reliability mechanism is
not active, after the failure is induced, the throughput drops to zero at Time = 4 sec.
When the reliability mechanism is recovering to IncludeOS, the re-instantiation begins at
Time = 9 sec. when throughput begins to return to its initial value.
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Figure 4.13: TCP Performance with IncludeOS Firewall Failure
Selecting the Docker VNF for re-instantiation, decreases the downtime of the firewall by 2
seconds, since throughput values are fully restored at Time = 7 sec.
The major differences between the two re-instantiation times was already expected since
the same differences were acknowledge in the previous subsection.
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Figure 4.14: TCP Performance with Docker Firewall Failure
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4.6.3.2 UDP Traffic
Regarding UDP traffic two types of iPerf were performed - 100 Mbps and 1 Gbps target
bandwidth - as it was done in the previous sections. The same type of evaluation that was
performed for TCP was now made for UDP.
The tests results are presented in the following figures. Figures 4.15 and 4.17 show the
results when the fail is induced in the IncludeOS firewall, and Figures 4.16 and 4.18 present
the results when the VNF is originally instantiated in the Docker platform. As in 4.6.3.1, the
failure was induced at Time = 3 sec.
As in the previous experiments, when the recover mechanism is not active after the firewall
disruption, throughput drops to zero and datagram loss rises to 100% at Time = 4 sec.
When the selected re-instantiation is IncludeOS, re-launching takes up to 6 seconds, only
being fully restored at Time = 10 sec. having full loss of UDP packets during that time.
Docker continues to be the best platform for re-instantiation for both target bandwidths,
as it can fully re-launch the service at Time = 7 sec., 3 seconds faster than the unikernel, and
having just 3 seconds of full datagram losses.
From evaluating the figures from sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3, it can be seen that the reliability
mechanism behaves the same way when there is not traffic transversing the firewall and when
the VNFs are processing high quantities of traffic, making it traffic independent.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (s)
0
50
100
M
bi
ts
/s
Throughput
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (s)
0
0.1
0.2
m
s
Jitter
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (s)
0%
50%
100%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Datagrams Lost
No recover Re-instantiation in IncludeOS Re-instantiation in Docker
Figure 4.15: UDP (100 Mbps) Performance with IncludeOS Firewall Failure
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Figure 4.16: UDP (100 Mbps) Performance with Docker Firewall Failure
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Figure 4.17: UDP (1 Gbps) Performance with IncludeOS Firewall Failure
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Figure 4.18: UDP (1 Gbps) Performance with Docker Firewall Failure
4.7 SDN Recovery Mechanism
To evaluate the reliability mechanism proposed in 3.3, the same iPerf tool as in 4.6.3 was
used. In 4.7.1 the mechanism is tested with two instances running in parallel and in 4.7.2 the
auto-instantiation procedure is evaluated.
4.7.1 Backup VNF Running in Parallel
As in 4.6.3 a failure is induced at Time = 3 sec. The results with TCP traffic are presented in
Figure 4.19.
It is clear that the SDN Recovery Mechanism significantly improves the service as there is
only a slight decrease in throughput when the flows are updated in the OvS bridges, this is
evident at Time = 4 sec.
Similarly to the previous test, a failure is induced at Time = 3 sec.. The results, when the
iPerf is performed with UDP packets with 100 Mbps and with 1 Gbps target bandwidth, are
presented in Figures 4.20 and 4.21 respectively.
When the SDN Recovery Mechanism is active, for 100 Mbps target bandwidth, the
redirection of traffic to the backup VNF is almost unnoticeable, with only a slight increase in
Datagram loss seen at Time = 4 sec.
As for UDP traffic with 1 Gbps target bandwidth, the redirection of traffic to the backup
FW is clear at Time = 4 sec., where a slight decrease of throughput is noticeable as well as
roughly 25% of UDP datagrams are lost.
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Figure 4.19: TCP Performance w/SDN Recovery Mechanism
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Figure 4.20: UDP (100 Mbps) Performance w/SDN Recovery Mechanism
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Figure 4.21: UDP (1 Gbps) Performance w/SDN Recovery Mechanism
4.7.2 Auto-Instantiation of Backup VNF
To test the performance difference when the backup VNF is automatically instantiated, an
iPerf of UDP packets with 1 Gbps target bandwidth was performed during 25 seconds. The
main VNF is instantiated as a IncludeOS unikernel and the backup VNF will be instantiated
as a Docker container, since it instantiates roughly 2 seconds faster than the unikernel (Figure
4.1). The results are presented in Figure 4.22.
At Time = 10 sec., the main VNF reaches a critical point where 80% of the allocated
memory is used, which triggers the instantiation of the backup VNF. The main VNF crashes
at Time = 15 sec. and the OvS flow tables are updated at that time.
Even though that is a slight decrease in throughput in comparison to when the tests are
performed with the two instances running in parallel, there is not a shattering difference. As
for datagrams losses, both implementations lose roughly the same amount of datagrams.
Due to the nature of the data-center environment, which in this case resources are restricted,
one could argue that the difference in throughput is worth it, as the backup VNF is only
instantiated when it is strictly necessary.
49
5 10 15 20 25
Time (s)
0
100
200
M
bi
ts
/s
Throughput
5 10 15 20 25
Time (s)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
m
s
Jitter
5 10 15 20 25
Time (s)
0%
50%
100%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Datagrams Lost
Auto-instantiation Running in parallel
Figure 4.22: UDP (1 Gbps) Performance w/auto-instantiation of backup VNF
4.8 Summary
This chapter presented the tests and results of the VNFs performance for metrics such as
instantiation times, latency, throughput and others. Also, the firewalls were evaluated on
the update time to new versions and the update effect on traversing traffic, showing that the
IncludeOS updates the fastest when the new versions are already pre-compiled and Docker
presents better reactions to live updates. Finally, the reliability mechanisms were tested
showing that Docker has a faster recovery time in all tests compared to the unikernel and
that the SDN Recovery Mechanism ensures near zero downtime when a failure occurs.
The next chapter presents the thesis’ conclusions, main contributions and future work.
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5 | Conclusions
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis presented a comparison of performance between two distinct types of virtualization
platforms - unikernels and containers - when instantiated as a VNF. A failure detection
mechanism and a recover mechanism were also developed to achieve higher reliability and
decrease the down-time of the VNF when a failure occurs.
From the results and analysis done in the previous chapter 4, we can conclude that
when the VNF is instantiated in a Docker container, lower end-to-end latency and lower
instantiation times for both stateless and stateful configuration are achieved. In terms of
throughput, the container performs slightly better than the unikernel when TCP traffic is
traversing the firewall. When the tests were done with UDP, both platforms presented the
same throughput when the target bandwidth was set to 100 Mbps and the IncludeOS unikernel
presented a smaller advantage in comparison to the container when the target bandwidth was
set to 1 Gbps. Regarding TCP retransmissions and UDP datagram losses, Docker firewall
performed better than the IncludeOS firewall in all tests. For jitter, both implementations
presented approximately the same values with UDP 100 Mbps target bandwidth, but the
unikernel jitter values for 1 Gbps target bandwidth were almost 3 times higher than the values
retrieved for the container. As for the VNF update time, the number of rules added does not
affect the update time for the IncludeOS firewall. This was expected since the IncludeOS
is a library OS and every version needs to be compiled. Even though the number of rules
affected the container update time, this platform presented an advantage since the update
can be performed without stopping the running VNF, maintaining the baseline performance
throughout the update.
The purpose of the recover mechanism was to minimize the down-time of the VNF. This
was achieved with the conjunction of both failure and switching mechanisms, where Docker
was proved to be the fastest platform for re-instantiation. This mechanism also demonstrated
to be traffic independent as the amount of traffic passing through the firewall did not affect
the time of re-instantiation.
To achieve zero downtime between failures, a SDN Recovery Mechanism was proposed.
This mechanism proved to be essential for the reliability of the service as the results from the
previous chapter 4 showed that with this mechanism, throughput values never drop to zero
and fewer TCP retransmissions take place as well as fewer UDP datagrams are lost, when a
failure is induced in the VNF.
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In conclusion, Docker containers proved to be a better platform than IncludeOS unikernels
for the instantiation of critical VNFs for the use-case presented in this work.
5.2 Contributions
This thesis execution resulted in a physical testbed that can be implemented as a baseline
architecture for future critical M2M use-case scenarios for the ongoing "Mobilizador 5G -
Components and services for 5G network" project. Still regarding the "Mobilizador 5G"
project, contributions were also made for the "Deliverable D3.1 - M2M critical communications
scenarios and analysis of architectures" report.
The work made on this thesis also resulted in the paper submission entitled "A Performance
Comparison of Containers and Unikernels for Reliable 5G Environments" to the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Design of Reliable Communication Networks
2019 Conference, with the authors João Barraca Filipe, Flávio Meneses, A. U. Rehman, Daniel
Corujo and Rui L. Aguiar.
5.3 Future Work
As future work, other more refined solutions including monitoring and operation assessment
mechanism more tailored towards commercial environments could be implemented to further
improve this type of services.
Also, other types of VNFs, such as DNSs, CDNs, IDSs could be compared between these
two different virtualization technologies. Not only other VNFs could be tested, but other
containers and unikernels could also be evaluated.
Another complement to the proposed architecture would be to take into account the
scalability of the VNFs running in the data-center. Since applications and services can have
fluctuating resources requirements, depending on external factors such as time of day, load
demand and network conditions, it is crucial to prepare these critical and reliable VNFs with
automatic scalability features according to performance requirements.
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Appendix-A: Sink Node
Dockerfile
FROM ubuntu:16.04
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
libc6 \
libpcap0.8 \
apparmor \
libssl1.0.0 \
libssl-dev \
net-tools \
traceroute \
iptables \
arping \
ipcalc \
iperf3 \
netcat \
inetutils-ping \
curl dnsutils wget vim ethtool tcpdump \
&& apt clean
COPY routes /routes
CMD /routes
routes
#!/bin/bash
ip route del default via 192.168.0.1
ip route add 10.0.0.0/24 via 192.168.0.3
echo ""
echo "----Sink Node Ready----"
echo ""
ip route
bash
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Appendix-B: Database
Dockerfile
FROM ubuntu:16.04
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
libc6 \
libpcap0.8 \
apparmor \
libssl1.0.0 \
libssl-dev \
net-tools \
traceroute \
iptables \
arping \
ipcalc \
iperf3 \
netcat \
inetutils-ping \
curl dnsutils wget vim ethtool tcpdump \
&& apt clean
COPY versions_docker /versions_docker #versions for the Docker Firewall
COPY versions_ios /versions_ios #versions for the IncludeOS Firewall
COPY http_server /http_server
CMD /http_server
http_ server
#!/bin/bash
python3 -m http.server
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Appendix-C: Docker Firewall
Dockerfile
FROM alpine
RUN \
apk --update add iptables coreutils bash
COPY start /start
CMD /start
start (Stateless - version 0)
#!/bin/bash
#Make the firewall stateless:
iptables -t raw -I PREROUTING -j NOTRACK
iptables -t raw -I OUTPUT -j NOTRACK
iptables -P INPUT DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
#Only allows tcp connections to whitelist IPs and 80/443 ports:
for i in {1..3} #White list - 192.168.0.1-3
do
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d 192.168.0.$i --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d 192.168.0.$i --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -s 192.168.0.$i -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -s 192.168.0.$i -j ACCEPT
done
#allow udp
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -j ACCEPT
#allow pings to pass through
iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT
#allow pings from outside:
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT
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#allow pings from inside:
iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT
echo "Firewall v0 Ready"
start (Stateful)
echo "Statefull Firewall"
rm current_version
wget 10.0.0.99:8000/versions_docker/current_version
chmod 777 current_version
./current_version
docker-compose.yml
version: "3"
services:
app:
image: fw_stateful_img
deploy:
resources:
limits:
memory: 256M
cap_add:
- ALL
networks:
- outside
- br
networks:
br:
external:
name: br
outside:
external:
name: outside
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Appendix-D: IncludeOS Firewall
NaCl - configuration file
Iface outside {
address: 10.0.0.2,
netmask: 255.255.255.0,
gateway: 10.0.0.1,
index: 0
}
Iface inside {
address: 192.168.0.3,
netmask: 255.255.255.0,
index: 1
}
Gateway myGateway {
forward: firewallchain,
outside_route: {
net: 10.0.0.0,
netmask: 255.255.255.0,
Iface: outside
},
inside_route: {
net: 192.168.0.0,
netmask: 255.255.255.0,
iface: inside
},
default_route: {
net: 0.0.0.0,
netmask: 0.0.0.0,
nexthop: 10.0.0.1,
iface: inside
}
}
allowed_services: [52,80,443]
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allowed_hosts: [10.0.0.2, 192.168.0.1-192.168.0.3]
Filter::IP firewallchain {
Filter::ICMP {
if (icmp.type == echo-request or icmp.type == echo-reply) {
accept
}
}
Filter::UDP {
accept
}
Filter::TCP {
if ((ip.daddr in allowed_hosts and tcp.dport in allowed_services) or
ip.saddr in allowed_hosts) {↪→
accept
}
}
log("Dropping from - ", ip.saddr, " -> ", ip.daddr," - Verify IP and/or
Port\n")↪→
drop
}
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